Oxstones Investment Club™Tunisia achieved the level of the success story based on the results of the recent political developments in the country. While some significant dangers remain clear and present in Tunisia (Mezran and Tazverdian, 2015), many encouraging improvements transpired. This paper looks at the reasons why the results in Tunisia clearly went far ahead compared to the events in other countries in the same part of the world where the process of the Arab Spring also took place. The recent major positive signs in Tunisia include, but are not limited to the designation of Tunisia as a U.S. Major Non-NATO Ally (U.S. Department of State, 2015) and a $230 million loan from the World Bank for the development of infrastructure (Amara and Heneghan, 2015). Of course, as of 2015, four years after the Arab Spring, the review of other countries that experienced the Arab Spring, shows that conditions, processes, and challenges in such countries also differ among themselves in nature and scale.
Tunisia is located in the northern part of Africa. The total area of the country equals 163,610 square kilometers or 63,170 square miles (CIA, 2015). This is slightly larger compared to the U.S. State of Georgia (ibid). The Mediterranean Sea coastline expands around the northern side of Tunisia and then continues as the major part of the eastern border of the country. The total length of the Tunisian portion of the Mediterranean Sea coastline equals 1,148 kilometers or 713 miles (ibid). The contours of Tunisia shape in such a way that the distance between western and eastern borders steadily decreases in the southern part of the country. Tunisia shares land borders with Algeria and Libya. The length of the border with Algeria stretches for 1,034 kilometers or 643 miles (ibid). The border with Libya equals 461 kilometer or 287 miles (ibid). As for the population, Arabs compose 98% from almost 11 million residents in Tunisia (ibid). The industry of tourism functions as the main component of the national economy (BBC, 2015). Almost 2 million reside in the national capital called Tunis (CIA, 2015).
The protests in Tunisia developed in 2010–2011 as a result of the internal dissatisfaction among the population. Tunisia pioneered in the protest actions in that particular period of time. It was the start of the Arab Spring. Events in other countries transpired later. The protesters in Tunisia did not look up to an external example, but followed their own understanding of urgency and needs for significant reforms.
Historically, women rights in Tunisia were clearly respected and promoted since 1956 creating an exemplar and a format for the neighboring countries (Charrad, 2007; Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013; CIA, 2015). Still, the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali administration in Tunisia de-facto tried to reduce women’s rights while attempting to do so quietly and avoiding official regulatory changes on this subject (Labidi, 2012). As the result, female citizens of Tunisia experienced an additional acute problem due to the discrimination. They could compare with the earlier decades and actively participated in the protests against the Ben Ali regime.
It became popular to compare the Arab Spring with the Prague Spring even based on the name of the event. The Prague Spring developed peacefully in Czechoslovakia in 1968 due to the combination of internal factors. In fact, outside of the name, not many commonalities exist between the Prague Spring and the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring including, but not limited to Tunisia, was an anti-government protest. The Prague Spring was a consolidated effort of reforms that originated top-down from the Dubcek federal administration, proceeded from careful preparation, and as intended, involved the broad participation and support from the population.
Many of the factors, that influenced the events of the Prague Spring, were by far not unique to Czechoslovakia. Instead, these tragic factors pertained to other countries of Central Europe and Baltics as well. The list includes, but is not limited to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist extreme political repressions, property confiscations in the late 1940s, central planning-oriented economic stagnation, limitation of political freedoms, shock from the communist crackdown on the protesters in Hungary in 1956, and so on. But the actions and the timing of the Prague Spring took place based on the situation that was determined in Czechoslovakia. By the same token, uniquely for Tunisia, the protest participants in Tunisia also based their actions and timing on the internal country-specific factors and tragic events. The Prague Spring could be significantly successful, but it was brutally suppressed externally, by the Brezhnev regime from the USSR, in August 1968.
It may be applicable to compare the anti-communist revolutions in 1989 and the Arab Spring in 2010–2011. Nevertheless, it is crucial to mention several key differences. The pro-Soviet communist regimes worldwide were extremely similar in the 1980s. Regardless from the location, cultural traditions, and demographic criteria, the Soviets and their puppet administrations in other countries kept pushing for the same failed economic systems deliberately ignoring many opportunities for economic growth. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) included the USSR and a number of Soviet allies. In reality, the Comecon served as the mechanism of the Soviet economic control. In terms of politics, the Soviet regime allowed minimal, if any, tactical flexibility to its allies. All strategic decisions and actions in international relations were pushed from Moscow to the satellite regimes with the goal of global dominance for Soviet totalitarianism.
The anti-communist protests and the post-communist reforms in the late 1980s–early 1990s were by far not limited to Europe and provided a huge impact in the very diverse parts of the world. The changes in the late 1980s–early 1990s differentiated due to the specific unique conditions in each country. For example, due to the extremely oppressive and violent natures of the regimes of Ceausescu and Mengistu respectively in Romania and Ethiopia, the changes could not be performed peacefully when the same regimes also led to extreme economic destruction. On a more fortunate side, Poland and Hungary peacefully experienced several years of gradual reforms and changes. In other countries, for example in Benin and Bulgaria, pro-democracy forces implemented peaceful emerging strategies as soon as the opportunities arose. The traditional domestic democratic institutions were restored in Panama and Lebanon. While the last two examples were not officially communist countries, the Soviet regime actively participated in increase of its own influence in Panama and Lebanon by allying with various agents of influence.
A strong, dedicated, and experienced network of dissidents existed in the late 1980s in the vast majority of the countries, controlled by the communist administrations and their allies, regardless from these countries’ locations. These dissidents had their programs developed and placed the specific focus on the conditions in their respective countries.
On the other hand, the Arab countries experienced really diverse situations in terms of economics, levels of income, international relations, domestic policies, demographic situations, education, human rights, social aspects, etc. in 2010. Certainly, the centuries of related history continue to play a very significant role. The common language always matters a lot. The Great Recession provided additional challenges to the overwhelming majority of the global community. But the country-specific factors in the Arab World have been, remain, and will continue to keep a very important role. Important enough for a very significant impact.
The radical jihadists deliberately perverted the real teachings of the faith of Islam, neglected many centuries of traditions, and created a “one size fits all” ideology killing both Muslims and non-Muslims. During the events of the Arab Spring, the radical jihadists attempted to use the time of the popular protest and to push their own agenda. By the same token, the “one size fits all” approaches, combined with the extreme violence, had been consistently used at least de-facto, and most regularly de-jure by the Soviet communists and their allies. The events of the late 1980s–early 1990s already placed such harmful combinations of “one size fits all” actions and violence on the losing side. The country-specific approaches led to the cases of success in the worldwide anti-communist protests the late 1980s–early 1990s. Now, in 2015, the encouraging signs in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Iraq also appear country-specific. For example, the Skhirat Agreement in Libya “represents an undoubtedly positive step forward” (Mezran, 2015). Another example: Iraq benefits from the continuously increasing cooperation between Arabs and Kurds.
There were multiple reports about the importance of social media popularity in the protests during the Arab Spring including, but not limited to the case Tunisia (Howard et al, 2011; Lister, 2011; Ghannam, 2011). These conclusions are totally correct. Social media worked as an effective channel of communications that was not available a couple of decades ago. By itself, social media brings capability in order to increase operational effectiveness, share information, and distribute the analysis, but does not necessarily guarantee the success. The channel of social media can vastly contribute to the efforts, but does not cause the regime change, let alone the follow-up policy. In other words, it serves as a very important tool for preparation and discussion. Such factors as a popular goal, support, and the successful actions need to take place for the success in the next stage.
The success of the democratization process in Tunisia can be attributed precisely to the facts that the process developed due to the country-specific challenges and severe problems associated with and caused by the Ben Ali administration. The democratization process was not just a copy. The factor of timing perfectly worked on the side of the protesters. While some destructive forces still try to destabilize the situation in Tunisia and even perform brutal acts of terror, such forces could not just size an opportunity of convenient timing for their own political gains as it happened with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Houthis in Yemen. The society in Tunisia was already prepared in 2011 to avoid such a danger.
Linking the positive experience of Tunisia to the neighboring countries, it becomes possible to be optimistic for the future. Yes, the recent past was hard in a number of cases for these countries. But now these countries develop on their own trajectories. It seems evident that the general population rejects the radical jihadists. Eventually, the Middle East may soon produce the massive development of center-right Muslim Democratic movements with a lot of attention to professional expertise, economic development, and stability in international relations.
Bibliography
Amara, Tarek, and Thomas Heneghan (2015). Tunisia gets $230 million World Bank loan to link interior, cities. Reuters. (http://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFL5N0ZV22L20150715). Published on July 15, 2015. Accessed on July 15, 2015.
BBC (2015). Tunisia country profile. (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14107241). Published on June 30, 2015. Accessed on July 3, 2015.
Central Intelligence Agency (2015). World Fact Book. (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/). Accessed on July 1-3, 2015.
Charrad, Mounira M. (2007). Tunisia at the forefront of the Arab world: Two waves of gender legislation. Washington and Lee Law Review, Volume 64, Issue 4, 1513-1527.
Charrad, Mounira M., and Amina Zarrugh (2013). The Arab Spring and women’s rights in Tunisia. E-International News. (http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/04/the-arab-spring-and-womens-rights-in-tunisia/). Published on September 4, 2013. Accessed on July 16, 2015.
Ghannam, Jeffrey. (2011). Social media in the Arab World: Leading up to the uprisings of 2011. National Endowment for Democracy, Center for International Media Assistance, 3.
Howard, Philip N., Aiden Duffy, Deen Freelon, Muzammil M. Hussain, Will Mari, and Marwa Mazaid (2011). Opening closed regimes: what was the role of social media during the Arab Spring? Project on Information Technology and Political Islam (PITPI). Working Paper 2011.1. Available at SSRN 2595096.
Labidi, Kamel (2010). Tunisia is backtracking on women’s rights. Cetri. (http://www.cetri.be/Tunisia-is-backtracking-on-women-s?lang=fr). Published on August 31, 2010. Accessed on July 16, 2015.
Lister, Timothy (2011). Tunisian protests fueled by social media networks. CNN. (http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/12/tunisia/index.html). Published on January 12, 2011. Accessed on July 17, 2015.
Mezran, Karim (2015). Is the Skhirat Agreement Libya’s first step to a brighter future? Atlantic Council. (http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/is-the-skhirat-agreement-libya-s-first-step-to-a-brighter-future). Published on July 16, 2015. Accessed on July 18, 2015.
Mezran, Karim, and Lara Tazverdian (2015). Tunisia: From elected government to effective governance. Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, June 2015.
U.S. Department of State (2015). Designation of Tunisia as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Media Note. Office of the Spokesperson. (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244811.htm). Published on July 10, 2015. Accessed on July 15, 2015.
Tags: Africa, Arab Spring, government, historic pattern, international relations, political development, secturity, tunisia, U.S. allies, U.S. Major Non-NATO Ally, World Bank